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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ARREST, SEARCH
AND SEIZURE
by
Barry Sorrels * and Lawrence B. Mitchell**
HIS Article examines some of the recent developments in the law of
arrest, search and seizure. Decisions from the United States Supreme
Court, in prior years, diminished the procedural safeguards afforded
by the fourth amendment The decisions during the Survey year affirmed
and explicated the diminution of those fourth amendment rights.
I. ABANDONMENT
In a trilogy of cases, Comer v. State,1 Hawkins v. State,2 and Salcido v.
State,3 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-examined the issue of aban-
donment as related to illegal search and seizure. In Comer, the court estab-
lished a new standard that courts should utilize in determining whether
abandonment had occurred,4 and thereby overruled, prior decisions in con-
flict with the new standard.5 The court applied the new standard in Haw-
kins and Salcido.
In Comer the court granted the defendant's Petition for Discretionary Re-
view to determine whether the arresting officers possessed sufficient informa-
tion to justify the investigatory stop that preceded the arrest. 6 Although the
court held on original submission that the detention and subsequent seizure
* B.A., Columbia College; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Partner, Burleson,
Pate and Gibson.
** B.A., University of Oklahoma; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Sole Practi-
tioner; formerly Associate Justice, Court of Appeals, Fifth District of Texas.
1. 754 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (opinion on rehearing).
2. 758 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
3. 758 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
4. Comer, 754 S.W.2d at 659.
5. Comer, Id. at 658. In reviewing prior authority on the issue of abandonment the court
noted that those decisions failed to properly develop a usable standard. Id. One line of cases
appeared unconcerned with voluntariness of the abandonment. Rodriguez v. State, 689
S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (property abandoned subsequent to a pretext stop
and search admissible); Clapp v. State, 639 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) ("When
police take possession of abandoned property, there is no seizure under the Fourth Amend-
ment"); McLain v. State, 505 S.W.2d 825, 827 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). A second line of cases
limited the inquiry to whether or not the suspect intended to abandon the property. Sullivan v.
State, 564 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (opinion on rehearing) ("Abandonment is
primarily a question of intent, and intent may be inferred from words spoken, acts done, and
other objective facts."); Smith v. State, 530 S.W.2d 827, 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
6. Comer, 754 S.W.2d at 656. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals in an unpublished
opinion found the existence of sufficient probable cause to support the arrest and subsequent
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were improper, 7 the State argued on rehearing that the court's inquiry
should not end with that determination but should also consider whether
Comer had voluntarily abandoned the property. The evidence established
that when the vehicle in which Comer was a passenger was stopped by the
police, he exited, dropped a syringe containing heroin, and attempted to kick
it under the truck. The State correctly argued that even if the detention was
illegal, the contraband was admissible if it had been voluntarily abandoned. 8
The court held that while abandonment of property or evidence can atten-
uate the effect of an illegal arrest or detention, the abandonment must be
voluntary and not the product of illegal conduct by the police.9 The court
fashioned a two part test to determine whether property is abandoned.' 0
The first component of the test inquires whether the defendant freely decided
to abandon the property.' The second component questions whether the
decision to abandon resulted from illegal police conduct.' 2 Although the
facts in Comer equivocally raised intent to abandon, the evidence clearly
established that the relinquishment of the contraband directly resulted from
illegal police conduct in the initial improper detention.13 Invoking the ex-
clusionary rule,14 the court required that the evidence be suppressed.15
Shortly after establishing the new standard in Comer for determining
whether abandonment had occurred, the Court of Criminal Appeals applied
the standard in Hawkins v. State and Salcido v. State, holding in each case
that the abandonment of the contraband occurred as a result of illegal con-
duct by the police. In Salcido, the police received information from an in-
seizure of contraband. Comer v. State, No. 2-83-317-CR (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, January 11,
1984).
7. One early evening two officers observed Comer and another male seated in a pickup
truck in the parking lot of a local restaurant. The interior dome light was on and the two men
were engaged in some type of activity inside the vehicle. As the officers approached the truck,
it began to pull away. The officers, believing that criminal activity had occurred, initiated an
investigatory stop. The officers also testified that the location in question constituted a high
crime area. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the activity observed was as con-
sistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity, thus rendering the detention and subse-
quent seizure unlawful. Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). Accord
Johnson v. State, 658 S.W.2d 623, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Shaffer v. State, 562 S.W.2d
853 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Tunnell v. State, 554 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
8. Comer, 754 S.W.2d at 658.
9. Id. at 659.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The court could find no meaningful distinction between a search conducted with-
out probable cause that results in the finding of contraband and the seizing of contraband
thrown or dropped because of police unlawfulness. Id.
13. Id. The Fifth Circuit has also held in numerous decisions that voluntariness is a criti-
cal factor in determining whether abandonment has occurred. In United States v. Santia-
Manriquez, 603 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir. 1979), the court ruled that while voluntary abandon-
ment of evidence would cure the taint occasioned by an illegal detention, the abandonment
would not be considered voluntary if abandonment was the product of police misconduct.
Accord United State v. Beck, 602 F.2d 726, 729 (5th Cir. 1979); Fletcher v. Wainwright, 399
F.2d 62, 64 (5th Cir. 1968).
14. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 484 (1963); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
15. Comer, 754 S.W.2d at 656.
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formant 16 that the suspect was selling drugs at a local car wash. The police
placed the suspect under surveillance for a few minutes, but an officer ob-
served no illegal activity. A second officer was summoned to join in the
surveillance. After brief observation, an officer approached the suspect and
advised him that the police had received information that he was selling
drugs. The suspect exited the vehicle and attempted to run. As he fled, the
suspect threw a small object to the ground. The object contained a con-
trolled substance.
In an unpublished opinion 17 the court of appeals agreed with Salcido's
complaint that the police conduct was improper due to insufficient probable
cause to arrest or search, and that there was not any reasonable suspicion
based upon articulable facts to justify even a temporary investigative deten-
tion.18 The court ruled, however, that Salcido's actions in discarding the
contraband in a place where he had no expectation of privacy amounted to
abandonment and therefore no fourth amendment violation occurred. 1 9 The
intermediate court did not determine the effect of the legality of police con-
duct on the abandonment.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the appellate court's rea-
soning in light of Comer, which established the new standard for determin-
ing abandonment. 20 The court agreed with the lower court that the facts of
the Salcido case would not justify either an arrest or an investigative deten-
tion.2 1 Salcido fled the scene and threw the object away only after the police
approached him and related their suspicion of his drug dealing, told him to
place his hands on the car, and placed their hands on his shoulder. The
court held that the police conduct was improper and that the defendant dis-
carded the object as a spontaneous reaction to the illegal police conduct. 22
The court held that the evidence Salcido had discarded was inadmissible. 23
16. 758 S.W.2d at 262. In testimony during the Motion to Suppress, the State did not
describe the informant, did not show that the informant had provided true and correct infor-
mation in the past, and did not show how the informant gained the information. The "two-
prong" test of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (credibility of informant must be
established and basis of informant's information must be provided) would clearly have been
violated because no information about credibility of the informant was provided. Aguilar v.
Texas, however, was modified in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241 (1983), where the
Supreme Court established the new "totality of circumstances" test. The Court held that "the
informant's 'veracity' ... and 'basis of knowledge' . . . are better understood as relevant consid-
erations in the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis that traditionally has guided probable-
cause determinations: a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability."
462 U.S. at 233.
17. Salcido v. State, No. 08-84-00053-CR, (Tex. App.-El Paso, December 27, 1984).
18. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The U.S. Supreme Court held in Terry that an
officer who investigates an individual may temporarily detain that individual if the officer
manifests an objective belief that the individual possesses a weapon. Id. at 24. The brief deten-
tion and search may be conducted for the safety of the officer even when no probable cause to
arrest exists. Id. at 24-27.
19. Salcido v. State, 758 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (citing unpublished
court of appeals decision).
20. Id. at 263.





In Hawkins v. State24 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals examined in
seriatim the legal doctrines of arrest, detention, and abandonment. Early in
the evening, a police officer observed Hawkins standing in a parking lot lo-
cated in an area designated as a high crime district. Narcotics officers had
informed the observing officer that Hawkins "dealt dope." The officer, act-
ing without the authority of an arrest or search warrant, and without having
observed criminal activity or having received a tip from an informant, ap-
proached Hawkins.
The officer called out for Hawkins to stop so that he could speak with
him.25 Hawkins responded inaudibly and continued on his way. The officer
issued a radio message asking for assistance, because the suspect was leaving
the scene. A second officer responded to the call, drove to the parking lot,
parked his vehicle and approached Hawkins. The first officer was fifty to
sixty feet away. When confronted by the second officer, Hawkins jerked his
hand out of his pocket and threw a paper bag in a nearby ditch. Although
Hawkins escaped this encounter, the police later arrested him and found the
discarded package, which contained a controlled substance.
The court first ruled, in accordance with the court below, 26 that Hawkins
was not arrested.27 Numerous Texas cases have held that an arrest occurs
when the individual's freedom of movement is restricted or restrained. 28
24. 758 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The court noted that the defendant had
not filed a written pre-trial Motion to Suppress. Id. at 258. Prior to commencement of testi-
mony, the trial court retired the jury, conducted a brief hearing concerning the search, and
ruled that no search had occurred. After the defendant excepted to the ruling, the trial court
pointed out that the defendant had failed to make a formal Motion to Suppress. Id. The
defendant then orally moved to suppress and stated his grounds. The trial court denied the
motion. Id. at 259. The court held that there was no question that error, if any, was pre-
served. Id. This holding follows established precedent, most recently summarized in Callo-
way v. State, 743 S.W.2d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988), with regard to preservation of error
for an illegal search. In Calloway, the court ruled that article 28.01 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure which permits a pre-trial hearing pursuant to a Motion to Suppress, is not
mandatory but is directed to the trial court's discretion. Calloway, 743 S.W.2d at 649 (citing
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 28.01 (Vernon, 1977)). The decision to hold a hearing on a
pre-trial Motion to Suppress rests within the sound discretion of the court. The court may
elect to rule on the merits of the Motion to Suppress upon the lodging of proper objection. The
court may decline to consider any pre-trial Motion to Suppress, yet the defendant retains the
right to raise an appropriate objection at trial. Calloway, 743 S.W.2d at 649.
25. In Daniels v. State, 718 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 885
(1986), the court noted that not all encounters between the police and the public bring into
play the protections afforded by the fourth amendment. "Police are as free as anyone else to
ask questions of their fellow citizens. Only when the questioning becomes a detention, how-
ever brief, must it be supported by reasonable suspicion." 718 S.W.2d at 704. The language in
Daniels appeared to establish a per se rule that an illegal stop fatally tained a consent to search,
whether the consent was valid or not. This interpretation, however, was expressly overruled in
Juarez v. State, 758 S.W.2d 772, 780 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). The appropriate standard
for review is: from the totality of the circumstances, was the consent voluntary and sufficiently
a product of free will that it would attenuate the taint of an illegal stop or arrest. Id. at 783.
26. Hawkins v. State, 644 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983), rev'd, 758 S.W.2d
255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
27. Hawkins, 758 S.W.2d at 259. Apparently neither case law nor statutory authority
exists in Texas recognizing such a thing as "formal arrest." McCrory v. State, 643 S.W.2d
725, 726, n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 15.22 (Vernon 1977)
("[a] person is arrested when he has been placed under restraint or taken into custody .... ").
28. Livingston v. State, 739 S.W.2d 311, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (arrest is complete
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The standard resembles the rule adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in United States v. Mendenhall, wherein the Court stated that seizure
of a person within the limits of the fourth amendment occurs when, in view
of the totality of circumstances comprising the incident, a reasonable person
would determine that he was not free to leave. 2 9 The court held that the
facts neither supported the conclusion that Hawkins believed that he was not
free to leave (he had simply walked away at a normal pace when the first
officer approached him) nor established police actions that indicated that
they were in the process of arresting Hawkins. 30
The Court, however, agreed with Hawkins' contention that he was the
victim of an improper investigative stop under the doctrine established in
Terry v. Ohio.31 An investigative stop is justified when specific and articul-
able facts, in light of the officer's experience and personal knowledge, com-
bined with rational inferences from those facts, would constitute more than
an inarticulate hunch, suspicion, or good faith suspicion that a crime had
occurred. 32 The prescriptions of the fourth amendment are not so restrictive
as to require a police officer to look the other way while a crime is in pro-
gress or a criminal escapes, simply because the officer lacks the exact level of
information required for probable cause to arrest. 33
In Hawkins no such articulable facts existed to justify the attempted de-
tention. The officers had no reason to believe Hawkins had engaged in crim-
inal activity or engaged in suspicious activity at the time of the detention.
After finding the police conduct illegal, the court turned its attention to
whether Hawkins had intended to abandon the property and, if so, whether
he had voluntarily abandoned it independent of the police misconduct. The
court concluded that Hawkins' decision to abandon the contraband directly
resulted from the actions of the police, and excluded the evidence as
inadmissible. 34
The court reached this conclusion only after a careful consideration of a
recent decision by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Chesternut.35 The issue
presented therein was whether an investigatory pursuit necessarily consti-
when person's liberty of movement is restricted or restrained); Hoag v. State, 728 S.W.2d 375
(Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Gregg v. State, 667 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (fourth
amendment context, person is arrested whenever his freedom of movement is restrained).
29. 446 U.S. 544, 545, 554 (1980). In Mendenhall the Court listed several examples of
situation that might indicate a seizure: 1) the threatening presence of several officers; 2) the
display of a weapon by the seizing officers; 3) physical contact between the officer and the
citizen; or 4) language or demeanor of the officer indicating that compliance with the officer's
request may be compelled. Id.
30. Hawkins, 758 S.W.2d at 260.
31. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The decision of the intermediate appellate court in Hawkins did
not address the investigative detention issue. Hawkins, 644 S.W.2d at 765.
32. Numerous state decisions are in accord with the general principles contained in Terry.
See Dickey v. State, 716 S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Johnson v. State, 658
S.W.2d 623, 626 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Ferguson v. State, 573 S.W.2d 516, 522 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978).
33. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972); Accord Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d
609, 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
34. Hawkins, 758 S.W.2d at 261.
35. 108 S. Ct. 1975, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988).
1989]
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tutes a seizure under the fourth amendment. Chesternut argued that the
police can never pursue an individual absent justification for suspecting that
the person is engaged in criminal activity.36 The State of Michigan posited
that the fourth amendment is never implicated unless the police actually
stop the individual.37 The Supreme Court rejected both absolutist positions
and adhered to its traditional contextual approach 38 so that the issue would
be resolved by taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding the
issue in dispute.39
In Chesternut four officers on routine patrol in a marked squad car ob-
served a car pulling over to the curb. A man exited the vehicle and ap-
proached Chesternut who was standing alone on the corner. As the patrol
car neared the corner where he was standing, Chesternut turned and fled on
foot. The squad car pursued and drove beside Chesternut as he continued to
flee. During the flight, the officers watched Chesternut discard a number of
small packets from his pocket. One of the officer exited the cruiser and ex-
amined the packets. While he did so, Chesternut stopped running and was
eventually arrested.
The Court noted that a police car driving parallel to a running pedestrian
could be construed as "intimidating. '"40 The Court held, however, that such
intimidation did not constitute a seizure. 4' The actions of the police did not
communicate an attempt on their part to intrude upon Chesternut's freedom
of movement.42
The facts in Chesternut, as noted by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
are distinguishable from those in Hawkins. In Chesternut the police did not
attempt to detain the suspect and therefore were not required to possess ar-
ticulable facts concerning criminal activity. Since no illegal police activity
occurred, Chesternut's discarding of the packets was done freely and volun-
tarily. In Hawkins the police did much more than simply follow and observe
the suspect. The police closed in on Hawkins in an attempt to detain and
question him. The police, by their actions, actually seized Hawkins without
reasonable grounds to believe that he had engaged in criminal or suspicious
activity. The actions of the police, which violated the precepts of the fourth
amendment, caused the suspect to abandon the property, thereby rendering
the property inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
II. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
For five years, various levels of Texas courts43 questioned whether the
36. Id. at 1975, 1977, 100 L. Ed. 2d 565, 567.
37. Id. at 1978, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 568.
38. E.g., INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
39. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. at 1979, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 569.
40. Id. at 1982, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 573.
41. Id.
42. In United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) the Court ruled that continuous sur-
veillance on public streets did not constitute a seizure for fourth amendment purposes. In
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) the Court held that the mere approach of the police to a
citizen did not constitute a seizure.
43. State v. Eisenhauer, No. 01-82-0501-CR (Dist. Ct. of Harris County, 209th Judicial
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totality of circumstances test, established in Illinois v. Gates" to determine
the sufficiency of probable cause to conduct a search and seizure, was appli-
cable when the complaint was based on a purported violation of article I,
section 9 of the Texas Constitution45 rather than a violation of the fourth
amendment. 46 The issue was resolved in favor of the applicability of the
test,47 yet the decision failed to resolve the much broader question of con-
flicting sovereignty between the Texas Constitution and the United States
Constitution.
In Eisenhauer v. State48 the intermediate appellate court held that the
warrantless arrest, search and seizure in question were improperly con-
ducted for failure to meet the "two-prong" test of Aguilar v. Texas.
49
Although unclear from the opinion itself, subsequent events established that
the court based this decision solely on federal constitutional grounds. The
court found the evidence sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Aguilar
test because of the detailed nature of the informant's allegations.50 The
court held, however, that the evidence was insufficient to establish the sec-
ond prong of the test because no evidence was offered to establish the in-
formant's credibility or that his information was reliable.51 Finding that
Dist. of Texas, 1988) rev'd and dism'd, 657 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1983),
rev'd and rem'd, 678 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); rev'd and dism'd, 684 S.W.2d 782
(Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1984); rev'd and trial court aff'd 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1988).
44. For a discussion of the Gates test, see supra note 13.
45. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions,
from all unreasonable seizures and searches, and no warrant to search any place,
or to seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as
may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
46. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no war-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
47. Eisenhauer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
48. 657 S.W.2d 184, 187 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1983), rev'd, 678 S.W.2d 947
(Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
49. 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964). The Aguilar test requires a showing of (1) the circum-
stances underlying the informant's conclusions and (2) the reasons the officer believed the
individual credible and the information reliable. Id.
50. 657 S.W.2d at 187. The police received information from an unknown informant that
Eisenhauer would depart from the local airport on a trip to Miami and that he would return
the same day with cocaine in his possession. A complete physical description of Eisenhauer
was given as well as a description of his clothing. Each detail concerning his physical descrip-
tion, clothing, date and time of departure, destination, and arrival, and name was verified by
police prior to the arrest. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
51. 657 S.W.2d at 187. The State offered no evidence tending to establish the informant's
reliability or credibility. The officer had not received information previously from the inform-
ant. Therefore, the officer had no basis for believing that the informant was credible or the
information reliable. The court contrasted the underlying facts of this case with those of Jones
v. State, 640 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982). In Jones, the police conducted a search
at an airport after being told by an informant of the arrival of a specific person, particularly
described physically and by attire, who would be in possession of a controlled substance. Eight
of the details supplied by the informant were corroborated by the police prior to the arrest.
Unlike the facts of Eisenhauer, however, the police had previously received information from
1989]
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probable cause was not established, the court held that the ensuing warrant-
less arrest, search and seizure were improper.5 2
The court made a brief reference to the recent decision in Illinois v. Gates,
which abolished the two-prong test and substituted the totality of circum-
stances test to determine the legality of arrests and searches and seizures. 53
The Supreme Court in Gates allowed the states to retain the two-prong stan-
dard at their election. 54 Citing this fact, the Eisenhauer court found that
Texas had not yet elected to abandon the two-prong standard. 55
On Petition for Discretionary Review, the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals noted that the intermediate appellate court decided the issue on federal
constitutional grounds even though the issue was presented under a Motion
to Suppress that alleged violations of both state and federal constitutions.5 6
The court granted the petition to determine whether the intermediate appel-
late court erred in not applying the totality of the circumstances test of Gates
rather than the two-pronged test of Aguilar.
Without discussion or authority, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
held that the totality of the circumstances test applies to warrantless arrests
and searches. 57 The court made a reference to its per curiam decision in
Bellah v. State,58 which held that the Gates test rather than the Aguilar test
would be applied in a case involving an affidavit for an arrest warrant. The
legality of the arrest and search of Eisenhauer was then tested by the Gates
standard, and the court found that probable cause existed to justify the ac-
tions of the police.59 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the
judgment of the court of appeals and the cause was remanded for that court
to rule .on the points of error complaining of violation of the Texas
Constitution.
On remand, the court of appeals again reversed the conviction, holding
that state law had been violated. 6° The court ruled that under Texas law
the informant on two occasions, which had proved to be correct. Thus, both of the prongs of
the Aguilar test were met.
52. Eisenhauer, 657 S.W.2d at 189. The defense counsel presented a second issue con-
cerning the purported consent of Eisenhauer to permit the search after his illegal arrest. The
court held that the totality of the evidence failed to support a finding that Eisenhauer volunta-
rily gave his consent.
53. 657 S.W.2d at 188 n.1.
54. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). "Finally, by requiring that the State first argue
to the state courts that the federal exclusionary rule should be modified, we permit a state
court, even if it agrees with the State as a matter of federal law, to rest its decision on an
adequate and independent state ground." Id. at 222.
55. 657 S.W.2d at 188 n.1.
56. 678 S.W.2d 947, 949 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
57. Id. at 952.
58. 653 S.W.2d at 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
59. Although the court specifically held that the Gates test was applicable to warrantless
arrests and searches, some doubt on the matter remained. Eisenhauer, 678 S.W.2d 947 at 955
(Clinton, J., dissenting). In Whaley v. State, 686 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), the
court held specifically that it was adopting the totality of the circumstances test to determine
the legality of warrantless arrests and searches when the challenge is made on federal constitu-
tional grounds.
60. Eisenhauer v. State, 684 S.W.2d 782, 786 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984),
rev'd, 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
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probable cause would be determined under the two-prong test of Aguilar.61
Again, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's Petition for
Discretionary Review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in
applying the Aguilar rule and whether probable cause existed to justify the
arrest and search. 62
The final Eisenhauer63 decision presented the court with its first clear-cut
opportunity to establish a uniform guideline for determining the existence of
probable cause under the constitution and laws of Texas.64 In order to for-
mulate its position, the court began an analysis of the nature and extent of
the protections afforded by the Texas Constitution.
The court could discern no significant differences as to the protections
afforded under the fourth amendment and article I, section 9 of the Texas
Constitution. Citing longstanding precedent, the court noted that in all ma-
terial aspects, the two constitutional provisions are the same. 65 Since the
court found the Gates standard appropriate in reviewing alleged fourth
amendment violations, it adopted that test for reviewing state claims as
well.
6 6
Although the court clearly held that the Gates test was adopted for review
of claimed state law violations, a broader issue remained unsettled. The
court wrote that the decision was written "to stay in step with the federal
constitutional model for probable cause determinations. ' 67 In a concurring
opinion joined by two other judges, Judge Duncan criticized the majority's
comments that the decision was made "to stay in step" with the decisions of
the Supreme Court. 68 The concurrence noted that the Supreme Court is not
vested "with divine guidance" and that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
should not abdicate its authority to reach different results if such is justified
under the law and circumstances. 69 Two dissenting opinions disagreed that
the court of criminal appeals was bound in some fashion to follow the pro-
nouncements of the Supreme Court if independent state grounds exist and
61. 684 S.W.2d at 785.
62. 754 S.W.2d 159 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 161. In Ware v. State, 724 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) the court held
that it was not necessary to determine whether either the Aguilar or Gates test was applicable
since the affidavit in that case failed to satisfy either standard. In Marquez v. State, 725
S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) the court ruled that it need not decide which test was
applicable since the facts were sufficient to establish probable cause under either standard. The
author of the opinion wrote, however, that "this State has always used stricter Aguilar-Spinelli
test for analyzing probable cause under article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution ...." Id.
at 233.
65. Eisenhauer, 754 S.W.2d at 162 (citing Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983) and Crowell v. State, 180 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1944)).
66. 754 S.W.2d at 164.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 166 (Duncan, J., concurring).
69. Id. Under the supremacy clause, article VI of the Federal Constitution, the Supreme
Court's decisions are the supreme law of the land. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 737
(1984). If, however, a state court decision is based on adequate and independent state grounds,
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction to decide the case so long as the state court's decision
does not fall below minimum guarantees of the federal constitution as made applicable through
the fourteenth amendment. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
1989]
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preferred to retain the Aguilar standard for claimed violations of article 1,
section 9.70
A majority of the court of criminal appeals has held that the Gates test
will be utilized to analyze claimed state violations. The argument made in
the lead opinion, that the court was compelled to reach that conclusion be-
cause of the decisions of the Supreme Court, appears to conflict with prior
authority. The three concurring judges and the two dissenting opinions ar-
gued that the court of criminal appeals should maintain the freedom to inter-
pret Texas laws and constitutional provisions in a different fashion than the
way the Supreme Court might interpret them under the federal
Constitution. 7'
III. PRIVACY INTEREST
In California v. Greenwood 72 the United States Supreme Court resolved
the hefty issue of the sanctity of garbage. The California Court of Appeals
affirmed the ruling of the California Superior Court, which had dismissed
charges against the accused because warrantless searches of his trash vio-
lated both the fourth amendment and the California Constitution. 73 The
Court reversed, holding that citizens have no fourth amendment expectation
of privacy in their garbage once it is placed next to the curb in opaque
containers. 74
The controversy involved the actions of members of the Laguna Beach
Police Department who had received information that Greenwood might be
involved in narcotics trafficking. 75 Realizing that the drug trafficking infor-
mation was insufficient to obtain a warrant, an officer asked the neighbor-
hood's regular trash collector to pick up the plastic garbage bags that
Greenwood left at the curb in front of his house 76 and turn the bags over to
her without mixing their contents with garbage from other houses. Once the
task was completed, the officer searched through the rubbish and found
items indicative of narcotics use. This information was presented in an affi-
davit in support of a search warrant. Upon execution of this warrant, the
police conducted a search that led to the discovery of large quantities of
cocaine and hashish at the house. The superior court dismissed the charges,
70. Eisenhauer, 754 S.W.2d at 166 (Clinton, J., dissenting); Id. at 176 (Teague, J.,
dissenting).
71. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
72. 108 S. Ct. 1675, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988).
73. California v. Greenwood, 182 Cal. App. 3d 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1986).
74. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1627, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 36.
75. An informant had provided information that a truck filled with illegal drugs was en
route to the Greenwood home and a neighbor had complained of heavy vehicular traffic late at
night in front of Greenwood's single family home. Surveillance conducted by the officer veri-
fied the heavy traffic and that a truck proceeded directly from the Greenwood home to another
residence also suspected as a narcotics trafficking location.
76. A county ordinance required residents to place their trash at the curb for pickup,
ORANGE COUNTY CAL. CODE § 4-3 -45(a) (1986) (residents must "remov[e] from the premises
at least once each week 'all' solid waste created, produced or accumulated in or about their




holding that a warrantless search of trash was improper."
Prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court had clearly established
that the warrantless search and seizure of the trash bags left at the curb by
Greenwood would violate the fourth amendment only if respondent mani-
fested a subjective expectation of privacy in his garbage that society accepts
as objectively reasonable. 78 Greenwood argued that he had an expectation
of privacy because the trash was placed for collection at a fixed time, the
bags were opaque plastic, 79 the collector was expected to pick up, mingle,
and deposit the trash at a garbage dump, and the trash was only temporarily
on the street with little likelihood that it would be inspected. The Court was
unimpressed with these arguments and held that Greenwood had exposed
his garbage to the public so as to deprive him of any fourth amendment
protection. 0
The decision focused not on Greenwood's expectation of privacy, a fact
readily conceded, but on whether society was prepared to accept that expec-
tation as objectively reasonable. According to the author of the Greenwood
opinion, numerous decisions by the federal courts of appeal8' and state ap-
pellate courts82 that had considered the issue upheld warrantless searches
77. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 539. After Greenwood was released on
bail, his garbage was searched again, another warrant was obtained, and a second search was
conducted. As a result of the second search, police discovered narcotics, and filed more
charges against Greenwood.
78. 108 S. Ct. at 1627, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 36. E.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177
(1984); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
79. Prior decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with opaque containers uniformly held
that as long as a package is closed against inspection its contents are protected by the fourth
amendment. See ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878) (discussing postal inspection of
mail). In Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 427 (1981) Justice Stewart pronounced for a
plurality that "unless the container is such that its contents may be said to be in plain view,
those contents are fully protected by the fourth amendment." In United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 800 (1982) the Court held that the fourth amendment protects the owner from war-
rantless searches and seizures of any container that conceals its contents from plain view.
Accord, Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1
(1977); United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 279 (1970). The applicability of these deci-
sions to Greenwood's opaque trash bags is questionable, however, since the factual basis of
each case was a container used for transportation, while Greenwood's containers, the trash
bags, were discarded.
80. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1626, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 33.
81. Id. at 1626, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 35. Two of the eleven federal courts of appeal decisions
relied on are factually or legally distinguishable. See United States v. O'Bryant, 775 F.2d 1528
(11 th Cir. 1985) (search of valuable briefcase discarded next to an overflowing trash bin on
busy city street); United States v. Thornton, 746 F.2d 39 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (good faith search of
trash approved). Seven of the decisions rely totally or in part on the discredited theory of
abandonment. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1632, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 42 n.2 (1988), (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
82. Id. Among the numerous state appellate decisions cited is Willis v. State, 518 S.W.2d
247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). In Willis the appellant and a friend occupied a room in an
apartment complex. The police were on the premises with the consent of the friend. The
police conducted a warrantless search of a container used for burning trash. The container, a
fifty gallon oil drum with its top removed, was maintained on the apartment premises for the
disposal of burnable trash. The contents were burned daily. The officers observed a partially
burned wallet among the refuse that was taken in the robbery for which the defendant was on
trial. The court of criminal appeals held "that this billfold having been deposited for burning
in a receptacle for that purpose was effectively abandoned by the appellant. It is well settled
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and seizures of trash left for collection in an area accessible to the public on
the grounds that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in discarded
trash.
The Court discerned two reasons why society lacked an expectation of
privacy with regard to trash. First, plastic bags filled with rubbish and set
on the curb are easy prey for all curious passers-by including animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops and other members of the public. 83 Second, Green-
wood placed his refuse at the curb with one purpose in mind, that is, to cease
possession of it in favor of the trash collector, who himself could choose to
open the bags and sort through them or allow the police to do So. 8 4 The
Court held that any result other than the one reached would, in essence,
have required the police to look the other way when confronted with evi-
dence of criminal activity which is in plain view of any member of the pub-
lic. 8 5 Since the majority opinion of the Court posited no exception or
limitation on the right to search trash, this weighty issue of overwhelming
importance to the nation8 6 appears to have been finally and completely
resolved.
that a warrant is not required for the seizure of abandoned property." Id. at 249 (citations
omitted).
83. 108 S. Ct. at 1627-28, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 36-37.
84. Id. at 1628, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 37.
85. Id.
86. Having resolved the burning issue of the right to search trash, the Court briefly ad-
dressed Greenwood's argument that the California constitutional amendment, eliminating the
exclusionary rule for evidence seized contrary to state but not federal law, violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28d. The Court ruled
that the state may eliminate the exclusionary rule for violation of a state right to be free from
illegal searches and seizures. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. at 1630, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 39. The Court
noted that in several instances it had ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment need not always be suppressed. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984);
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
The applicability of the exclusionary rule, when placed under scrutiny by either the state or the
federal government, is based upon a balancing of the benefits of deterring improper police
conduct against the societal costs of excluding reliable evidence of criminal activity.
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